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 Nietzsche’s Die dionysische Weltanschauung: 
Faith and Nihilism
Part Two
 Nietzsche’s “Dionysian worldview” as an existentialist interpretation of 
meaning and purpose in reaction to the growing trend of Nihilism at the 
end of the 19th century
Crane ROHRBACH
A consequence of the Industrial Revolution in Europe was the focus on 
science and rationality in conditioning man’s relationship to the world, in 
creating a new identifying statute of culture with science, that the world of 
human life was the product of human action. It determined new principles of 
intellectual freedom for an eager desire to follow whatever ideas they brought 
forth and follow them wherever they led, even if they transgressed against 
the constraints of social and religious orthodoxies. Nietzsche examined 
premises of established ideas, re-examined them, relative to the social atmo-
sphere of the dominance of the scientific status. But unlike Schopenhauer’s 
bleak skepticism of man’s historicism and scientism, Nietzsche sought to 
find some forms of affirmation for life despite the growing predominance 
of nihilism in western culture, that which Schopenhauer’s criticicism of 
historicism in his Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung expresses: that the 
history of man is superfluous to the essence of reality.
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“A real philosophy of history [i.e., Humanity’s truth in reality] …consists, 
therefore, not in elevating the temporary aims of men into something eternal 
and absolute, and in constructing artificially and in imagination their advance 
to it through all complexities; but in the insight that history, not only in its 
execution but already in its essence, is mendacious….
The true philosophy of history consists…in the insight that, in all the end-
less changes and their disorder, one is yet confronted always only with the 
same, identical and unchangeable essence….This identical element, which 
persists amid all change, consists in the the fundamental qualities of the 
human heart and head – many bad, a few good.”1
Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, saw little in historicism (i.e., history, the 
science of humanity) that could elucidate what man in reality is-- “There is 
a degree to which history may be promoted, and a valuation of it, at which 
life shrivels away and becomes debased.”2 However, unlike Schopenhauer 
whose philosophy concluded in an ultimate skepticism for any possible 
meaning, albeit other than one of total meaninglessness—as history is the 
pointless “striving, doing, suffering and fate of the human race,”3 Nietzsche 
pursued a line of thought that would attempt yet to find something to affirm 
in life despite the rationale that it lacked “meaningful” purpose. 
Nietzsche attacked the “tradition of ideas”— and then even the idea of 
nihilism itself. Ideas that evolved over the Christian centuries into cultural 
ideals, those that were based on metaphysical premises at variance with the 
new realities which rationalism ushered into society, and which, ironically, 
became the sources from which nihilism would draw its own power of 
conclusion.
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Nietzsche’s Dionysian Life-Philosophy: A Faith in Antithetical Values
The growing importance of scientific ideas as a mode of interpreting 
reality conflicted with the old morality of the Judeo-Christian concept 
of humanity’s purpose in life and its values of meaning. This conflict of 
Christian culture with a rising modern (science-based) society created a 
crisis of meaning—significant even today—a crisis of spiritual conscience 
with rational consciousness: How to adjust reality to save the appearances 
of meaning which Christianity had given to mankind, and yet, to maintain 
the authority of reason and of what is “rational.” Nihilism was the non-
resolution. Nietzsche’s philosophy of the existential was to this pernicious 
condition of irresolution: that an affirmation of personal meaning in life 
is yet possible even without the faith-based universal meaning promised 
by Christianity; that individual purpose was meaningful in defiance of the 
rationale that man in an ahistorical reality can’t possibly have any ultimate 
significance. Nietzsche used the only “reasoning” left, that of the irrational 
to conclude that life could be understood as meaningful; he established 
a new perspective of the irrational, the Dionysian instinct, as a means to 
ground this new understanding, that paradoxically, can make existence 
meaningful despite ultimate meaninglessness.
His specific treatment of existentialism as the “Dionysian” raises important 
issues about meaning and purpose, particularly in relation to traditional 
factors associated with society, culture, and spirituality. It further raises 
questions about the interpretation of tragedy, suffering, and the finite na-
ture of human existence—the three conditions which give the question of 
meaning its relevance. Nietzsche’s dionysische Weltanschauung provides 
an interesting platform for developing one’s understanding of how reality 
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relates to experiences of crisis and loss, a new perspective on life, an 
alternative to both the Judeo-Christian interpretation of human significance 
and rationalism’s devaluation of it.
Nietzsche’s Dionysian perspective is a philosophy of life and spirit; life 
which enfolds spirit and sustains it: A philosophy of a new culture for 
life. Nietzsche’s Dionysian worldview is a mere perspective, not a truth. 
A perspective as tool for creating a response to unappealing realities. It 
is a re-valuation of the valuation of the irrational.
The Dionysian is not metaphysical irrationalism as an ultimate value, 
however. I find that it seeks merely to give recognition to the value of 
irrationalism in allowing one to creatively respond to the tragic conditions 
of life. For Nietzsche even if it were true that the rational is the being-of-the 
world and irrationality an epiphenomenon, nothing follows from that about 
any evaluative priority of rationalism. (And coupled with rationalism is the 
metaphysical idea of totality, that even immanent limits can be transcended 
but yet remain within a whole of spiritual meaning.) Nietzsche’s Dionysian 
points out the obvious that it could after all be true that the whole is the 
irrational and only a part of the whole rational. 
Life philosophy begins as a philosophy of awareness; ultimately words 
and reason will not suffice, that’s why even the most devout of the faithful 
personally faced with the greatest of horrors, suffering, and injustice ask 
“Why?” Nietzche challenged the presupposition that rationalism has greater 
priority over irrationalism because of rationalism’s functional achievements 
on behalf of life, and he confronted the idea of Christianity, that which 
attempts to give meaning to life: that “God’s words will always prove true 
and right, no matter who questions.”4 
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His Dionysian perspective is a “new agreement” for the “old agreement 
didn’t even work,” for “if it had, there would have been no need for 
another to replace it.”5 Nietzsche speaks of this “new agreement” as the 
Dionysian to replace the archaic Christian concepts of reality (“for the old 
one is out of date and has been put aside forever.”)6 and as an alternative 
to Schopenhauer’s worldview of the total disengagement of any agreement 
of meaning with reality. 
The New Agreement: The Dionysian and Nihilism
Nihilism is a ‘rational’ response to the prevailing objective truth of man 
in reality: Nihilism as an interpretation of truth that the essence of all 
activity is purposeless or indifferent. Nietzsche’s Dionysian worldview is his 
critique of this ideology of reality and a critique of the metaphysical illusion 
that thought is capable of understanding reality. Nietzsche’s Dionysian is 
a theme of the negation of rationality for providing solutions to the issue 
of existential meaningfulness; the rejection of ‘objectivity,’ that the logical 
basis for knowledge somehow clears the path for understanding human 
needs and behavior. This critique leads directly to Nietzsche’s confrontation 
with the eminence of science and reason in our life, which he views as just 
another form of faith: “Faith, n. Belief without evidence in what is told by 
one who speaks without knowledge about things without parallel.”7 
Nihilism for which there is no escape for the individual from the fatal 
chain of rational objectivity in reality, for every individual is himself a part 
of this whole fateful reality. It is utter vanity for the individual to seek to 
break apart the chains of a reality of which he is bound in nothingness. 
The binding force of reality, of all of what constitutes the universe of 
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space, matter, and time itself, is what constitutes it: reality is, in Nietz-
schean terms, only “will to power.” As such it is both subject and object of 
itself-- it is the object reality subject to the permanence of tensions and of 
constant changes. Reality exists without fixed being for it is ever its own 
becoming, without perishing; or in other words, its being is its becoming 
and its perishing for its being feeds on itself: Man’s Being, therefore, is 
not relevant to reality itself; it is quite inconsequential to the significance 
of the becoming of the world in which he lives. 
Humanity moves in its tireless and self-conscious efforts to overcome 
this reality; it “lives” but is consigned to a tragic fate over which it has 
no control. When all is said, the conscious exercise of our will amounts 
to a delusion, a rationalization of dark instinctive drives (Triebe) which 
dispose of us on all levels of our being. Whatever we may take for our 
“activity” is at heart only something that comes to pass by way of our 
existence, and that we are, as it were, fated to do. 
Living is no more than a passing of activities; life but a passion that we 
undergo. Passing and passion both literally, a happening. Existence as an 
event that by fate, and historically, is bound to come into being through and 
by our existence. (Etymologically in German: Geschehen “event,” Geschick 
“fate,” Geschichte “history”.) It is, paradoxically, an “act” of ours that we 
must suffer to be performed by us; an ‘act’ that has meaning only as an 
heroic assertion of being:
“Who sees the abyss but with the eyes of an eagle; who grasps the abyss 
with the talons of an eagle—that man has courage.”8
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Nihilism and Tragedy 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian is the positive address to two related issues which 
spiritualism (religion and metaphysical meaning) ultimately fails to give full 
satisfaction: nihilism and tragedy. ‘Tragedy’ is for Nietzsche an anthropo-
centric term, the existence of which in the worldview of man should not 
be accommodated, and nihilism is man’s ultimate expression of the tragic 
because it cannot be convincingly refuted Christianity:
“In Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a single point of 
contact with reality. Nothing but imaginary causes, nothing but imaginary 
effects. ... Intercourse between imaginary beings and imaginary natural sci-
ence (anthropocentric: no trace of any concept of natural causes)….”9 
For Nietzsche, nihilism is the necessary consequence of man’s obedience 
to rationality in conflict with his culture of metaphysical morality; but it 
is itself a philosophy based on the (false) significance of the tragic. Its 
very rejection of ‘meaningfulness’ presumes ‘meaning’ is significant to 
human existence: However, Nihilismus itself is yet another morality which 
Nietzsche rejects because it rejects life. Nihilism as a psychological state, 
one which is reached when a meaning is sought in all events that is not 
there: “Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, 
the agony of the ‘in vain,’ the insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to 
recover and to regain composure—being ashamed in front of oneself, as 
if one had deceived oneself all too long.…”10
Nihilism is as much a solipisistic interpretation of life as is Christianity; 
it is just the “morality” of meaninglessness as is Christainity a morality 
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of man’s salvation, and both fail to satisfy because of the presupposition 
that “meaning” is a necessary category of existence.
Nihilism is an interpretation of rationality—and rationality is but another 
morality, that knowledge and truth are good. Yet nihilism, Christianity, and 
rationality are all based on the moralities of meaning, and all moralities are 
mere interpretations. Nihilism is, then, the interpretation of man’s reality 
that man’s existence is meaningless, and therefore, tragic. (There is no 
real ‘tragedy’ in the Christian view, as all is God’s will and all will be set 
correct in the posited afterlife.) Again, tragedy is the personifying of reality 
in terms of a negative morality. Morality is an interpretation; interpretation 
is knowledge, and knowledge is itself then just another morality:
“Morality is such a curious science because it is in the highest degree 
practical: so that the position of pure knowledge, scientific integrity, is 
at once abandoned as soon as the claims of morality must be answered. 
Morality says: I need many answers—reasons, arguments. Scruples can 
come afterward, or not at all--.”11
As for tragedy itself, it is a value, not an event; it is mere interpretation. 
Again, it is predicated upon the most basic of human conventions, upon 
language, both as verbal expression and gesture. Tragedy as the esthetic 
ethos of “good” and “bad.” This is the Nietzschean concept of tragedy as 
a genre: that human tragedy, metaphysically seen, is an interpretation of 
the world as a stage for the tragic sense of life. Existence is man’s drama: 
“The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact but a 
fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it 
is “in flux,” as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always 
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changing but never getting near the truth: for—there is no “truth.”12
Tragedy and “Amor fati”
“ I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in 
things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor 
fati: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against 
what is ugly…Looking away shall be my only negation…I wish to be only 
a Yes-sayer.”13
The tragic vision of life is the issue which nihilism surrenders itself 
to without further response; for Nietzsche, the ‘error’ of nihilism is the 
misunderstanding of the significance of tragedy—nihilism would have it 
that life is meaningless and therefore tragic--meaningless because there is 
not something more than just one’s life and that time of it. For Nietzsche, 
however, tragedy is that which gives life meaningful significance, for tragedy 
is a kind of virtue which creates the heroic. 
Amor fati is Nietzsche’s positivistic term for the tragic in life. “Tragedy” 
is a term for the weak who succumb to the allure that man is the center 
of meaning—and then are crushed by the truth that he is the center of 
nothing; Amor fati is the term which commands the tragic hero to obey 
the will to power which is life: it is the meaning (the Dionysian) which 
pursues life itself, and not a meaning within it. Amor fati controls and 
drives him toward his inevitable doom; the tragic hero’s acceptance of his 
“meaningless” fate is the beautiful because he pursues life nonetheless. Thus, 
grace, dignity, and courage are virtues which are possible only through 
Amro fati, because of the existence of tragic in life. For Nietzsche what 
gives the tragic hero the chance to display his heroism is the certainty of 
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annihilation; thus, the most awful truths of human existence are what make 
heroism possible—and, ironically, make life meaningful. Amor fati: that 
life is meaningful only because it is transitory and filled with “tragedies,” 
for transitoriness and the tragic are what are necessary in order for the 
individual to have the meaning of being virtuous and heroic.
Fate and “Ja-sage”
“Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems; the will to 
life rejoicing over its own inexhaustibility even in the very sacrifice of its 
highest types—that is what I call Dionysian …Not on order to get rid of 
terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous affect–but on 
order to be oneself the eternal joy of becoming. …”14
According to this passage, the individual accepts life and all it entails 
(even destruction), and accepts it actively. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche describes 
this acceptance “…as a formula of supreme affirmation born of fullness, of 
overfullness, a Yes-saying without reservation, of suffering itself, of guilt 
itself, of everything questionable and strange in existence. …This ultimate, 
most joyous, most wantonly extravagant Yes to life represents not only the 
highest insight but also the deepest….”15 
Thus, suffering is no objection to existence, not even in its eternal recur-
rence, --but rather, one reason more for one becoming the eternal Yes to all 
things, the tremendous, unbounded saying affirmation into all abysses.16
“The affiirmation of passing away and destroying,…the decisive feature of 
the a Dionysian philosophy, saying Yes to opposition and war, becoming, 
along with radical repudiation of the very concept of ‘being’—.”17
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Existential “Ja-sagen” and rationality oppose one another. Nietzsche 
rejects rationality as the means of coming to terms with our reality. He 
does not reject the claim that reason plays an important role in the life; 
rather Nietzsche is concerned with whether reason/rationality enhances 
or limits life. And rationality itself is not the issue; it is man’s excessive 
rationality, his over valuation of rationality which has led him to the face 
of modern day nihilism. 
However, reason and rationality do play a fundamental role in human 
nature, and should be cultivated to enhance life--to the extent which it can, 
but ‘reason’ at the expense of other instincts has the opposite effect: it 
reduces life to science and technology, stripping even one’s religious faith 
away. So when Nietzsche writes that “art is the good will of appearance,”18 
he is referring to the psychic healthfulness of being unreasonable, of wearing 
a “fool’s cap”19 to help us deal with the truth of reality which otherwise 
would lead us “to nausea and suicide.”20 An irrational perspective on reality 
gives one the creative freedom to make sense of chaos, to explore a richer 
life of possible significance and its own temporal meaningfulness. The 
irrational ‘artists’ of life do not reject reason, but that they do not make 
a tyrant of it; they are in control of it and can let it pause to make room 
for other instincts when necessary:
“At times we need a rest from ourselves by looking upon, by looking down 
upon, ourselves and, from an artistic distance, laughing over ourselves or 
weeping over ourselves; we must discover the hero no less than the fool 
in our passion for knowledge, we must occasionally find pleasure in our 
folly, or we cannot continue to find pleasure in our wisdom!”21
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Nietzsche’s Affirmations: Dionysus and Apollo 
The Birth of Tragedy introduced two fundamental Nietzschean terms: 
the Dionysian and the Apollinian, a unity that is conceptually distinct. The 
relationship between the terms is not one of simple opposition, although 
antinomic, but of a conflicting parallelism and of a complex synthesis, the 
synergy when Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo, and Apollo finally 
the language of Dionysus. The mythopoeic terms cover a concept as a 
discourse (logos) for the genesis of further ideas; they express Nietzsche’s 
misology in man’s reasoning for meaning. Nietzsche’s gods sweep away 
the minutiae of suffering and the “spell of that perspective”22 and give 
transfiguration to the individual as the tragic hero.
The Apollinian and Dionysian are not the literal gods, but rather tropes or 
the the meta-language which Nietzsche had to use to expound his ideas; they 
are the metaphorical used as expressions of psychological drives (Triebe). 
Nietzsche saw the ancient gods as standing for the fearful realities of a 
universe in which mankind had no special privileges and turned them into 
symbolic manifestations which signify what is creative and possible for man 
to achieve: the Apollinian and Dionysian are essentially the primal drives/
forces (Macht) of man’s nature that have been repressed through culture 
and the socio-historical defined order of his existence. The Apollinian is 
the drive to individuation, the drive of form, balance, proportionality; the 
force of plasticity, ‘image,’ and the dream, the force of light and (positive) 
limitation. The Dionysian is the drive to unity, the primordial nothing-
ness-- the “Ur-Eine”: It is expressed as ‘self-overcoming,’ and its analogy 
is frenzy and intoxication.
— 55 —
Nietzsche saw the ancient gods as standing for the fearful realities of a 
universe in which mankind had no special privileges., a universe which does 
not respond to man’s questioning. For Nietzsche, what gave the possibility 
of dignity to existence was the presence of the tragic and the meaningless; 
they combine to allow the individual to assert purpose, to display heroism, 
and thus they are what make heroism true: The certainty of one’s annihilation 
is the very opportunity of allowing one to be heroic, for greatness to be 
personified, and of making one’s life worth living. How so?--because reality 
is “not an organism at all, but chaos”23 and for man that is its terror and 
tragedy; heroism achieved requires that one face his reality with dignity 
and grace. The greatest, the ultimate force of the universe is expressed by 
its meaninglessness for man, and for the individual to overcome the ‘truth’ 
of this reality, one must affirm life despite its “meaningless” nature--that 
one affirms one’s life despite its meaninglessness. This idea is the closest 
Nietzsche comes to being an ‘irrationalist’: that to affirm one’s significance 
in a meaningless universe is ‘irrational’ ; that one can creat personal sig-
nificance in existence although his reality is essentially meaningless. For 
Nietzsch, that life contains this tragic antinomy does not entail that one is 
fated to nothingness: “What makes one heroic? Going out to meet at the 
same time one’s highest suffering and one’s highest hope.”24
The Dionysian 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian worldview addresses itself to self-purposefulness, 
not to personal meaningfulness; but fulfilling the former answers the latter. 
The Dionysian is the self’s power of transformation; its energy is “artistic,” 
distinctly the creativity of re-shaping and mastering the raw conditions of 
his reality. It is the conscious mastery, control, and overpowering of his 
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material to create what he can of his interpretation of the world. Man the 
artist who creates the hero. The Dionysian power of transformation makes 
the man who accepts his destiny to act for the creativity of his being in 
the world; one who is able to create a personal purposive order and unity 
out of the otherwise meaningless. And what is it that Meaningless asks 
other than “What is the purpose?” If all is meaningless, then there is no 
purpose; for Nietzsche, however, the issue is turned so that the significance 
of purpose is gained because of meaningless. What greater beauty is there 
than the heroism of man who knows and accepts the meaningless yet 
creatively styles a purpose nonetheless. 
The question of ‘meaning’ is confused as an issue of “happiness.” (In-
sofar as “pleasure” and “happiness” are distinct emotions, often at odds 
with one another.) Yet it would be better understood as a question of 
one’s purpose—happiness has nothing to do with one’s purpose, no more 
than is the degree of one’s happiness in some corresponding relation to 
a pleasure. Purpose is without predication; there is no ‘ought’ to one’s 
purpose: What one does simply is one’s purpose, and that doing is one’s 
meaning—purpose justified. The question of meaning then is not Dionysian 
because the question of ‘the meaning of life’ is not a “real” issue at all; it 
has been artificially formulated on the presumption of happiness. According 
to Nietzsche, as I interpret, it is not a serious (rational) existential question 
for “meaning” is already defined in purpose, and purpose is just what 
one does. Of course that does not satisfy those who want happiness and 
pleasure to have some stake in meaning, but for those who seek meaning 
through forms of happiness and pleasure, their being is the purpose of 
asking the question.
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The Dionysian Self: Being and Becoming as an Aethethic Phenomenon
The self, the primordial self (Ur-Eine), is the center of experience, the 
moving center of its purposeful world, a point about which the phenomenal 
world spreads. The objects of this center of the world are all sorts of 
‘objects’ of one’s consciousness—“empirische,” “Realität,” “Vorstellung,” 
“Schein,” “Bild,” etc. Existence, then, is this relationship between the Ur-
Eine and the projected world of purpose and its objects.25 These are the 
“two halves of our existence, the waking and the dreaming states.”26 The 
Dionysian is the ecstasy of the universal self, the primordial, which is the 
dream world of symbolic powers; it is the imagistic embroidering of one’s 
existence and reality. 
Existence has this paradoxical unreality about it: It is empirically real but 
essentially meaningless, and it is metaphysical (unreal) and meaningful. But 
both conditions are static pictures of the world; they are the static ideals 
of being of the becoming, which is essential reality. How can becoming 
ever be reflected in a static pose? The issue for Nietzsche is that these 
two forms are exclusive of one another, and yet, modern culture desires 
to keep these images of reality transposed over one another, as it were, 
which does nothing more than confuse one’s clear sight of what both 
visions seek to distinctly reflect. For Nietzsche, the sensual metaphysical 
image may be as real as the empirical, but they are both no more than 
images of a dynamic and ever changing reality. 
Man’s purpose is as individual possibility; there is no meaning to man 
apart from the creative self. Nietzsche conceives of the perspective of the 
possible. The Dionysian force of creation is the force of possibilities, that 
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which can transform, shape, dominate, integrate, idealize reality; it is the 
dynamic center of one’s being in a reality of meaninglessness. Possibility 
is creative; and the creative is Nietzsche’s concept of life justified as an 
“æsthetic phenomenon.” Life as “art” is a Dionysian perspective; it encom-
passes different ideas, of purpose and freedom, creativity and beauty, but 
essentially it is the perspective of the affirmation of the possible:
“Dionysian art …wants to convince us of the eternal delight of existence. 
But we must seek this delight, not in appearances, but behind them.”27 
Perhaps it is the description of the Dionysian as one of intoxication and 
“mystical obliteration”28 which allows for an uninhibited participation in 
life—uninhibited to feel the power to affirm life, to feel fearless in its real-
ity. The Dionysian is an illusion spread over things. Illusion is a creative 
opportunity, and that is what Nietzsche means when he says, “Dionysian 
art wants to convince us of the eternal delight in existence.”29 All art is, for 
Nietzsche, an overcoming of things as they are; it is the will to conquer 
“being,” to eternalize oneself in becoming. 
This “becoming” is a self-idealizing, in seeing the essence of one’s be-
ing in a reality whose being itself is always the becoming. The Dionysian 
perspective mediates between rationalism and faith, replaces the need for 
‘meaning’ with the idea of purpose: Purpose is one’s possibilities; possibil-
ity is one’s freedom; freedom is the essence of creativity, and creativity 
is the significance of beauty. If nihilism is correct and life is rationally 
‘meaningless’ then, according to Nietzsche, such meaninglessness does 
not result in the negation of life and purpose, but rather is the offering of 
creative possibility within its lived experience. 
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Dionysis and Art
The work of art is a common Nietzschean metaphor for the self of 
man, and “existence is justified as an “aesthetic phenomenon”30 because 
it is a mode of escape from the horrors of man’s reality, “Here beauty is 
victorious over the suffering inherent in life. The pain is brushed away 
from the face of nature.”31
The ‘escape’ is from pain to pleasure, from meaninglessness to mean-
ingfulness; it is the overcoming of suffering with joy through the act of 
‘escaping.’ This overcoming is not dialectical in the sense that ‘escaping’ 
is the synthesis (Hegelian) as a third term; rather that the two terms (suf-
fering and joy) exist as necessary parallels (the one exists because of the 
other). Nietzsche’s dionysische Weltanschauung is the choice of joy over 
suffering. 
“Art makes the sight of life bearable by laying over it the veil of unclear 
thinking.”32 
The “unclear thinking” is the intoxication of the Dionysian energy of 
the ecstatic self; and the Dionysian ecstasy taps into the universal self and 
releases the symbolic powers of identity and meaning through art: 
“If there is to be art, if there is to be any aesthetic doing and seeing, one 
physiological condition is indispensable: intoxication (Rausch) –What is 
essential in such intoxication is the feeling of increased strength and fullness. 
Out of this feeling one lends to things, one forces them to accept from us, 
one violates them—this process is called idealizing….
A man in this state transforms things until they mirror his power—until 
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they are reflections of his perfection. This having to transform into perfec-
tion is—art.”33
Nietzsche is not referring to the plastic arts, of course, but to the art itself 
of creativity—in this case, the creation of meaningfulness (Idealisiren). This 
is the artistic energy of shaping and mastering, not that of projecting. Man 
in conscious mastery and control of the ‘material’ of existence is an artist; 
for the artist, like the man who really loves his destiny, is able to bring 
purposive order and unity into the accidental and meaningless.
Art and Symbolism 
“I know of no more exalted symbolism than this Greek symbolism, the 
symbolism of the Dionysian. The profoundest instinct for life, the instinct 
for the future of life, for the eternity of life. …”34
Art is both metaphysical and empirical in that it employs a full range 
of symbolic powers to ‘assert’ a truth about reality. The Dionysian self 
drives forth all the symbolic powers, and the symbolic powers are various 
levels of meaning which represent or show man’s possibilities. Nietzsche 
repeatedly refers to Dionysian ecstasy as exciting all the symbolic powers 
inherent within one’s sense of creativity, but what exactly is meant by 
‘symbolic powers,’ and what are the specific assertions they make for 
one’s existence?
“In the Dionysian…man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his sym-
bolic faculties….Now the essence of nature is to be expressed symbolically; 
we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body 
is called into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech, 
— 61 —
but the whole pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into rhythmic 
movement….To grasp this collective release of all the symbolic powers, 
man must have already attained that height of self-abnegation which seeks 
to express itself symbolically through all these powers.”35
The primacy of the Dionysian worldview here is the idea that “self-abne-
gation” is not the nihilistic relinquishing of oneself to an arbitrary universe 
into a world of pessimism and meaninglessness; it is the self-abnegation 
of one’s personal need for meaning, and with that one is transformed into 
a world of symbolic potentials. 
This personal transformation is the creative adaptation of oneself of the 
empirical world in which one is essentially insignificant to a reality of 
symbolic meaningfulness. Nietzsche apparently means that acts have their 
own kind of meaning, and thus, they are symbolic; they are kinds of ‘as-
sertions’ which express reality, reality here being the Dionysian “Ur-Eine.” 
However, these layers of symbolic meaning gravitate between two parts, 
the Dionysian and the Apollinian.36
Symbolism of the Gods: Apollo and Dionysis
“…the one truly real Dionysus appears in a multiplicity of shapes, in the 
mask of a struggling hero, and, as it were, bound up in the nets of the 
individual will. So now the god made manifest talks and acts in such a 
way that he looks like an erring, striving, suffering individual. The fact 
that he appears in general with this epic definition and clarity is the ffect 
of Apollo, the interpreter of dreams. …”37
The Apollinian definitely introduces a new realm of symbolic possibilities 
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and a new kind of articulation. Nietzsche’s Apollo is the “interpreter” of 
the Dionysian: Dionysus is objectified by the Apollinian. The Dionysian is 
still causally basic, but the Apollinian adds a distinct kind of articulation; 
without the Apollinian, one merely feels the value of life in experiencing 
Dionysian energy for Dionysian reality is characterized by nature on which 
no form has been imposed, and to this disorder, the Apollinian imposes 
the ideal of images; it gives ‘form’ to force. The imposition of symbolic 
form onto the world is the only response to suffering; this suffering is 
characterize by the profound sickness of (ultimate) meaninglessness which 
obsessive rationality has introduced to our lives. It follows that in order 
to render this suffering (the tragedy of man’s meaningless fate) tolerable 
what needs to be done is to find some fulfillment in the creation of mean-
ingfulness: “the ugly that could not be removed…has been reinterpreted 
and made sublime…”38
However, the question arises how this Dionysian instinct can be redemp-
tive, how the loss of meaningful individualization can be a joyous hope 
considering that the realities of horror remain.
Nietzsche’s Dionysian concept of ‘the ugly,’ the tragic, is that it can be 
a kind of ‘tonic’ to life; essentially, if all were in bliss, then how would 
one know unless ‘tragedy’ was a real possibility? How does one know the 
good without an awareness of the evil? Tragedy, therefore, is essential to 
life; it is as much an intoxication for the senses as bliss—but of course 
their relation to the individual are quite different: tragedy is significant for 
one’s happiness in terms of its presence for others, wheras bliss is more 
significant for oneself than for others. But tragedy is also significant for 
oneself in direct confrontation with oneself because it grants the possibility 
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of other virtues, such as courage, heroism, perseverance, and empathy. 
Thus, tragedy in the Dionysian worldview is far removed from pessimism 
and nihilism; it is above all an affirmation of life of further possibilities 
in one’s life. 
If man cannot rationalize tragedy, he consigns himself to nihilism; if he 
rationalizes it, he is consigned to pessimism. The way out for Nietzsche was 
too affirm (Ja-sagen) the seeming ‘irrationality’ of tragedy in the context 
that it provides the opportunity for personal “greatness. This greatness is 
achieved by one affirming life despite its tragic meaninglessness, and is 
Nietzsche’s concept of the Dionysian:
“The word ‘Dionysian’ means: an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond 
personality, the everyday, society, reality, across the abyss of transitori-
ness: a passionate-painful overflowing into darker, fuller, more floating 
states….”39
The Dionysian is the natural force (Macht) which shakes man out of his 
peaceful, rational condition of awareness and enraptures him; the Dionysian 
exemplifies uninhibited energy and passions let loose; it is an organic meta-
phor for how man can live with meaninglessness and tragedy by creating 
meaningfulness: Creating is the Dionysian redemptive wisdom to the reality 
of human tragedy.—“the consciousness of once having glimpse the truth, 
man now sees everywhere only the horror and absurdity of being.”40
The Apollinian Ideal: Kunstanschauung
Light and clarity, symmetry and beauty; these are the artistic intuitions 
which drive man to form. Form is function in the Apollinian ideal. Func-
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tion in the general sense of having some purpose; purpose which therefore 
becomes a rational undertaking. Something is because it has meaning 
through purpose. Apollo is the symbol for understanding and making sense 
of the world; he is the radiance of rationality—der “Scheinende.” A sculp-
ture has a purpose to a exhibit a meaning of “beauty.” That it is already 
exhibits meaning: minimalistically, the purpose of doing is the meaning of 
its beauty. Thus, there is purpose to all forms because all forms have some 
function; and to a greater or lesser extent purposes then do have meaning. 
The Apollonian is what is rational because of its effect of structure. The 
structure of the world has meaning according to the Apollonian ideal.
In opposition to the Dionysian sense of the Chaos which is the organic 
compound of reality, the Apollonian is form and significance—but it is also 
the illusory; illusory because it is what is made of the world, not the world 
in itself. Man seeks to form meaning from reality, but whatever meaning 
derived is ultimately illusory. Both religion and scientism seek meaning; 
the former through faith, the latter through facts, nonetheless both are based 
in rationalistic modes of thought—that is, a need to know and make sense 
of the world. Religious beliefs are therefore rationally motivated, and their 
explanations of the world are structured—rational; Scientism and religion 
are both within the Apollonian ideal, they are forms of man’s understanding 
of the world, and as such illusory truths. 
What is illusory to scientism is that understanding is explanation; know-
ing the origins of the universe explains nothing: suffering, injustice, and 
death remain unmoved. If religion then would explain these catastrophes 
of existence, that is no understanding: one may understand the explanation 
but not the meaning. The “why” remains so the devout abandon themselves 
— 65 —
to faith. Rationalism answers to itself, but not to the world. Nietzsche’s 
objection to rationalisim, the apollonian Kunstanschauung, is not that it 
is valueless, but that it is overvalued. 
Summa summarum
The Dionysian is an instinctual lust; it is the lust of one’s becoming for 
one’s own self-creation. It is a problematic position involving a circle of 
relativism, nihilism, and axiology. Nevertheless, it is a central issue for 
Nietzsche’s total philosophy for it is bound up with his negation of the 
postulate of reason and rationality as positive guiding forces of modern 
society: rationality as the blind desire to know everything, without selectiv-
ity or distinction with regard to what is actually knowable and worthy of 
knowing. For Nietzsche, rationality is not the logic which makes knowledge 
worthy of truth; it is just its own logic. Nietzsche considers conceptual 
knowledge as an overestimation of reality, it takes linguistic-logical (gram-
matical) categories to be actual categories of being. His question, “…are 
the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure 
for us to create reality, the concept “reality,” for ourselves?”41 is the issue 
which the alogia of the Dionysian responds to.
The ability to “overcome,” then, is no less an essential feature of human 
nature than rationality in Nietzsche’s view. Today it is the overcoming 
of the burden of the historical-cultural forces to which we are born; the 
very evolutionary instinct of homo sapiens that allowed it to overcome 
and conquer the forces of nature is the instinctual drive which rationality 
and Christianity seek to repress, and thereby, they being responsible for 
the modern phenonmenon of nihilism. Nietzsche speaks of the rational 
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need to embrace ‘irrationality’ for man to normalize himself, to regain his 
psychic health from the grip of nihilism in a world determined by natural 
forces and chaos. But this ‘overcoming’ requires that we are able to turn 
on ourselves, to be able to turn away from the divisive cultures of rational-
ism and religious metaphysics which dominate our perpective of life and 
reality--not to reject them by the turning away, but in the ‘turning’ being 
able to become more flexible in our responses to the conditions of life, 
and in so doing gaining greater strength to direct the forces that constitute 
our drives. For Man is made up of drives—instincts—and the Dionysian 
is the force of creativity “giving style to one’s character,”42 by assessing 
every possibility of reality and shaping the whole into an “artistic plan.” 
To overcome oneself is to be able to embrace all of reality for the sake 
of the independence of one’s creative soul, and this is one’s ‘artistry’ in 
dealing with the fundamental concerns of human existence.
Man is the possibility of the ‘aesthetic phenomenon’ which justifies 
(his) existence: that beauty is of one’s heroic life; and that heroism is 
made possible only by the realities of one’s finitude and the possibility of 
real suffering. The virtues of courage, dignity, and grace are what justify 
tragedy, for only is it that through tragedy are they made possible to be 
able to be expressed. Thus, life must be heroic if it is to be beautiful; 
and it can only be heroically beautiful if there is a doom which cannot be 
escaped or explained, and yet, it is embraced without fear. For Nietzsche, 
the ‘good life’ is the active life, one in which the will to power expresses 
itself in heroism; and heroism is a creative instinctual drive of a Dionysian 
perspective. The way to do this is to turn upon oneself, to shape one’s 
character and make it strong in the face of reality: ‘power’ for Nietzsche 
is first and foremost power over oneself, the power to be commended and 
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pursued but not in the sense of arbitrary dominion over others, but rather 
the power as the will to face one’s tragic reality; it necessitates the practice 
of self-overcoming—to overcome pain and suffering, and to do what seems 
most difficult—to live with meaning in a meaningless universe.
Nietzsche’s dionysische Weltanschauung has many facets; principles 
such as the priority of act over circumstance, the demand of reality over 
expectation, and the criteria of necessity and desire, but essentially it can 
be viewed as an understanding that action defines meaning: Life itself 
constitutes the act of meaning. The despair of “meaning”--the dark concep-
tion of nihilism that prevails in modern society—is only relevant because 
of tragedy, yet tragedy is a quality of action, and action is the language 
of the human experience. Nietzsche’s Dionysion perspective is not about 
understanding reality or an explanation of life, it is an idea of the centrality 
of transformation; that act which embraces the limitations of human control 
and understanding of reality, and responds to them as opportunities for 
experiences that enlarge and heighten one’s own meaning in life. It is the 
perspective that one’s life itself is the criterion of what counts for meaning; 
that the meaning of life is just that which one gives to it. 
.
Key to Abbreviations of Texts 
BGE Beyond Good and Evil (Jenseits von Güt und Böse)
BT The Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie)
D Daybreak (Morgenröte)
DD Dionysische Dithyrambs (Dionysos-Dithyramben)
EH Ecce Homo 
GM On the Geneology of Morals (Zur Genealogie der Moral)
GS The Gay Science (Die fröliche Wissenschaft—La Gaya Scienza)
HAH Human, All to Human (Menschliches, allzumenschliches)
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TI Twilight of the Idols ( Die Götzen-Dämmerung)
Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Also sprach Zarathustra)
WP Will to Power (Der Wille zur macht)
Notes
1. Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation, Vol. II. Ch. 38 (Die Welt 
als Wille und Vorstellung) 
2. Nietzsche. Werke, (K. Schlecta) Vol. I, p. 210
3. Schopnehauer. The World as Will And Representation, Vol. II. Ch. 38 
4. Romans 3.4 The Living Bible, 1971. Tyndale House Pub. Wheaton, Ill. 
5. ibid. Hebrews 8.7 
6. ibid. Hebrews 8.13
7. Ambose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (1911)
7a. AC. Sec. 52: “‘Faith’ means not wanting to know the true.” / “ ‘Glaube’ heißt 
Nichtwissen-wollen, was wahr ist.”
8. Z. Part Four, On the Higher Man (73.4, s.3)
9. AC. 15
10. WP. Bk. i. 12.1 
11. WP. Bk. ii. 423 
12. WP. 616. 
13. GS. iv. 276
14. TI. Was ich den Alten verdanke / EH on BT (see TI. p. 139)
15. EH On BT 2 
16. EH of Z 6 
17. EH on BT. 3
18. GS. ii. 107 “…die Kunst, als den guten Willen zum Scheine.”
19. ibid. “— nothing does us as much good as wearing a fool’s cap: we need it in 
relation to ourselves—we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, 
childish, and blissful art lest we lose the freedom above all things that 
our ideal demands of us.” 
20. ibid.  “…the realization of general untruth and mendaciousness …(of) science--the 
realization that delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge and 
sensation. … Honesty (the rational truth of the world) would lead us to 
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nausea and suicide.” 
21. ibid. 107; also GS. ii. #78
22. GS. ii. s.78 “…  the spell of that perspective which makes what is closest at hand 
and most vulgar appear as if it were vast, and reality itself.” 
23. WP. Bk. iii. 711  “daß die Welt durchaus kein Organismus ist, sondern das 
Chaos.”
24. GS. iii. 268  “Was macht heroisch?—Zugleich seinem höchsten Leide und seiner 
höchsten Hoffnung entgegengehn.”
25. The “object” here does not mean purpose or thing; it is an intentional state in 
the sense in which Bild is the object of a state of dreaming.
26. BT, sec. 4 
27. BT. 17 
28. BT. 2 “mystischen Selbstentäusserung”
29. BT. 17  “Auch die dionysische Kunst will uns von der ewigen Lust des Daseins 
überzeugen…”
30. GS. ii. 107  “As an artistic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art 
furnishes us with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience 
to be able to turn ourselves into such a phenomenon.”
31. BT. 16. 5  “Here beauty is is victorious over the suffering inherent in life. The 
pain is, in a certain sense, brushed away from the face of nature.”
32. HAH. s.151  “Die Kunst macht den Anblick des Lebens erträglich, dadurch dass 
sie den Flor des unreinen Denkens über dasselbe legt.”
33. TI, “Skirmishes…,” sec. 8-9
34. TI. What I owe the Ancients. 4
35. BT. sec.2 
36. BT. sec. 1 “…these two instinctual drives….of dreams and of intoxication…” 
37. BT. sec. 10 
38. GS. Bk. iv. 290 
39. WP. s.1050
40. BT. 7.9 
41. WP. Bk. iii. a. 516.3 
42. GS. Bk. iv. 290 “to ‘ give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is 
practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weak-
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nesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan 
until every one of them appears as art and reason and even 
weaknesses delight the eye.” 
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